DJLS Discourse journal on Law and Society

E-ISSN: 3089-6797
P-ISSN: 3089-6789

Research Article

Legislative Oversight and Performance Accountability in Selected Strategic Economic Institutions in Indonesia: A Public Governance Perspective

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Abstract. This study examines how legislative oversight is translated into performance accountability across selected strategic economic institutions in Indonesia, focusing on the oversight relationship between Commission VI of the House of Representatives (DPR RI) and the Ministry of Trade, state-owned enterprises and Danantara Indonesia, BP Batam, and state-owned banking institutions. The study employs qualitative document analysis and structured secondary-data triangulation using an empirical corpus of parliamentary records and communications, institutional performance reports, laws and regulations, official institutional releases, and reports from established news agencies, while applying a public-governance framework comprising four oversight functions—information acquisition, performance interrogation, corrective direction, and follow-up accountability—across financial, operational, governance, public-value, and adaptive-performance dimensions. The findings indicate that legislative oversight strengthens performance accountability when scrutiny systematically connects resources, targets, implementation problems, institutional outcomes, and public consequences beyond mere procedural compliance, although accountability is constrained by fragmented indicators, inconsistent performance definitions, information asymmetry, limited follow-up, and tensions between political responsiveness and managerial autonomy, which are particularly evident in the emerging governance architecture of Danantara and in BP Batam's simultaneous achievement of strong investment outcomes and exposure to scrutiny over budget efficiency, land governance, and transparency. To address this, the study develops the Oversight-to-Accountability Conversion Framework (OACF), which explains how legislative scrutiny generates public value when information demands are converted into verifiable commitments, corrective actions, and systematic follow-up by integrating legislative oversight, performance management, hybrid governance, and public-value perspectives.

Keywords: BP Batam; Danantara; Indonesia; legislative oversight; Ministry of Trade; performance accountability; public governance; state-owned enterprises.

Received: March 15, 2026
Revised: May 12, 2026
Accepted: July 15 , 2026
Published: September 02 , 2026
Curr. Ver.: September 02, 2026

1. Introduction

Strategic economic institutions occupy an unusual position in contemporary public administration. They are expected to act with the speed, technical competence, and strategic focus associated with market organizations while remaining subject to public law, political authorization, fiscal discipline, and democratic accountability. This duality is especially visible in Indonesia, where the governance of trade, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), strategic investment, free-trade zones, and state-owned banking combines ministerial authority, corporate governance, regulatory mandates, parliamentary scrutiny, audit, and public expectations. The resulting accountability environment cannot be understood through a narrow corporate-governance lens or through conventional bureaucratic performance measurement alone. It is a public-governance problem involving multiple principals, multiple objectives, overlapping accountability forums, and competing definitions of performance.

The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) exercises legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions. Within this architecture, Commission VI has a particularly important position because its portfolio covers institutions that shape markets, public assets, investment, trade, competition, and state-owned corporate activity. Parliamentary records from 2025 demonstrate that Commission VI used working meetings, hearings, specific working visits, and other oversight forums to interrogate commodity-price stabilization, SOE corporate performance, budget efficiency, trade supervision, investment governance, and institutional restructuring. For example, the Commission's March 2025 activity report records a working meeting with the Ministry of Trade on the stabilization of basic-goods prices and supplies before Ramadan and Eid, alongside hearings evaluating the 2024 performance and 2025 roadmaps of major state-owned construction enterprises (DPR RI, 2025e). These activities show that oversight is not an abstract constitutional function; it is an operational process through which legislators demand information, test explanations, communicate expectations, and attempt to influence administrative behavior. The legal context of the cases was explicitly included in the corpus: Law No. 1 of 2025 and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 establish the contemporary legal and organizational basis for Danantara, while Government Regulation No. 46 of 2007 (as amended) and Government Regulation No. 41 of 2021 provide core legal foundations for the Batam Free Trade and Free Port governance setting (Republic of Indonesia, 2007, 2021, 2025a, 2025b).

Yet the existence of oversight does not automatically produce accountability. Public administration research distinguishes the production of performance information from its meaningful use. Performance systems may support learning and decision-making, but they can also become ceremonial devices used to demonstrate compliance or legitimacy without changing organizational behavior (Korac et al., 2020; Nitzl et al., 2019; Siverbo et al., 2019). Indonesian evidence similarly suggests that monitoring, external audit, institutionalization, and managerial capacity matter for performance accountability (Akbar et al., 2026; Muhtar et al., 2021). Consequently, the analytical question is not simply whether parliament oversees strategic economic institutions. The more consequential question is how oversight is converted into performance accountability: what information is demanded, what dimensions of performance are examined, what corrective expectations are articulated, and whether subsequent actions can be traced.

This issue has become more salient following major changes in Indonesia's SOE governance. The creation and subsequent institutional development of Danantara Indonesia represent a significant reconfiguration of state-asset governance. Reuters reported in February 2025 that parliament approved the legal basis for a Temasek-like investment agency intended to improve returns and performance from state assets, while also noting concerns about political interference and investor confidence (Reuters, 2025a). Danantara's own 2026 statement emphasizes transparency, accountability, financial disclosure, consolidation, and audited financial statements under the applicable legal framework (Danantara, 2026). Commission VI's July 2025 meeting on Danantara's structure and work plan similarly emphasized prudence, business feasibility, monitoring of fund use, good corporate governance, and periodic reporting to the DPR (DPR RI, 2025g). These developments sharpen a classic public-governance dilemma: how can the state delegate commercial decision-making to a professionally managed investment structure without weakening democratic answerability for public assets?

The same dilemma appears in different form in BP Batam. BP Batam combines public authority, investment facilitation, infrastructure development, land administration, and management of a strategically important free-trade and free-port area. Its 2025 investment performance was strong by several official measures. ANTARA reported that real investment reached Rp69.30 trillion in 2025 against BP Batam's Rp60 trillion target, while national investment-reporting data recorded Rp44.01 trillion against a different target basis (ANTARA, 2026). BP Batam later explained the methodological distinction between LKPM-based figures and its bottom-up investment calculation (BP Batam, 2026b). These figures illustrate an important accountability problem: performance may be positive while the measurement architecture itself remains complex. Parliamentary scrutiny in 2025 also addressed budget absorption, land governance, transparency, and the relationship between higher proposed budgets and benefits to citizens (DPR RI, 2025h, 2025d). Thus, legislative oversight must interpret not only whether a target is met, but also how targets are constructed, what evidence supports them, and whether success on one indicator obscures weaknesses elsewhere.

The Ministry of Trade provides another governance setting. Its mandate includes domestic trade, consumer protection, market supervision, export development, and trade policy. Commission VI oversight in 2025 addressed commodity prices, import risks, domestic-industry protection, distribution governance, and the adequacy of the ministry's budget. In October 2025, a Commission VI hearing on refined sugar distribution urged stronger supervision, more transparent commodity-balance governance, evaluation of import permits, sanctions for violations, and routine reporting through information systems (DPR RI, 2025f). This is a useful example of oversight moving from broad political concern to specific administrative expectations. It also demonstrates that performance accountability in economic governance cannot be reduced to financial absorption or aggregate trade values; it includes regulatory quality, market integrity, enforcement, information accuracy, and protection of affected groups.

State-owned banks add a further dimension. Himbara institutions operate as commercial banks, public-policy instruments, and components of the state-owned enterprise system. Their accountability therefore spans financial soundness, shareholder value, access to finance, public-service continuity, crisis resilience, and policy implementation. Commission VI's scrutiny of state-owned banking in late 2025, including expectations for service continuity in disaster-affected areas, reflects this multi-dimensional public mandate (DPR RI, 2025a). The example reinforces the argument that strategic economic institutions should be evaluated through a public-governance perspective that recognizes commercial performance but does not equate commercial performance with public performance.

Existing scholarship provides important but fragmented insights. Corporate-governance studies examine boards, political influence, ownership, and institutional environments (Apriliyanti & Randøy, 2019; Zattoni et al., 2020). SOE research emphasizes hybridity, political-business logics, and the risks of state intervention (Grossi et al., 2021; Inoue, 2020; Liechti & Finger, 2019). Public-management research examines performance information, accountability, and dysfunctional measurement effects (Korac et al., 2020; Nitzl et al., 2019; Siverbo et al., 2019). Indonesian studies show that monitoring and institutionalization can improve accountability while political and organizational conditions affect how performance information is used (Akbar et al., 2026; Muhtar et al., 2021). What remains underdeveloped is an integrated explanation of how parliamentary oversight interacts with performance-accountability systems across heterogeneous strategic economic institutions.

This article addresses that gap through three research questions. RQ1 asks: How does legislative oversight frame and interrogate performance in Indonesia's strategic economic institutions? RQ2 asks: What accountability gaps become visible when parliamentary evidence is triangulated with institutional performance information and credible public reporting? RQ3 asks: What governance mechanism can convert legislative scrutiny into sustained performance accountability without collapsing managerial autonomy into political micromanagement?

The study contributes in three ways. First, it links legislative oversight to performance-management scholarship by treating oversight as a process of performance-information use rather than merely a constitutional authority. Second, it applies a hybrid-governance perspective to institutions whose mandates cross public and commercial boundaries. Third, it develops the Oversight-to-Accountability Conversion Framework (OACF), which specifies the conditions under which oversight can generate learning, correction, and public value. The framework is particularly relevant for emerging economies where strategic institutions manage large public assets and are simultaneously exposed to market pressure, political expectations, and administrative accountability.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Legislative oversight as an accountability institution

Accountability is fundamentally relational. An actor is accountable when it is required to explain and justify conduct to a forum that can question, judge, and potentially impose consequences (Bovens et al., 2014). Legislative oversight is one institutionalized form of this relationship. Parliament is not the day-to-day manager of ministries, agencies, or SOEs, but it is a democratic forum with authority to request information, scrutinize policy and expenditure, evaluate implementation, and make political or formal demands for correction. In principle-agent terms, legislative oversight reduces information asymmetry and monitors delegated authority. In public-governance terms, however, oversight is broader: it connects administrative action to public purposes, competing values, stakeholder claims, and democratic legitimacy.

Oversight can fail in at least two directions. Weak oversight allows opacity, managerial drift, and insufficient challenge. Excessively interventionist oversight can generate short-termism, politicization, or inconsistent demands. Liechti & Finger (2019) show this tension in SOE governance: parliament has legitimate authority to scrutinize government steering, but hands-on parliamentary intervention can itself complicate coherent strategic management. The implication is not that legislative oversight should be reduced. Rather, its quality depends on whether scrutiny is anchored in transparent objectives, comparable evidence, role clarity, and follow-up mechanisms.

This distinction is important for Indonesia's strategic economic institutions. A ministry is hierarchically embedded in government; a public authority such as BP Batam combines regulatory and development functions; an SOE is a corporation with state ownership; a state-owned bank is regulated as a financial institution; and Danantara introduces a consolidated investment-management layer. The same parliamentary question can therefore have different governance implications depending on institutional form. Asking a ministry to explain implementation is different from instructing a company on a commercial transaction. A public-governance perspective requires oversight to be calibrated to mandate, risk, and accountability architecture.

Performance Accountability and the Use of Performance Information

Performance accountability is more than reporting. It links goals, resources, activities, outputs, outcomes, explanations, and consequences. Performance information becomes useful when decision-makers employ it for monitoring, attention focusing, learning, strategic adjustment, resource allocation, and public explanation. Nitzl et al. (2019) demonstrate that different uses of performance information have different relationships with organizational performance. Korac et al. (2020) similarly distinguish purposeful from legitimizing uses and show how institutional pressures can encourage symbolic use. Siverbo et al. (2019) warn that performance measurement can generate dysfunctional consequences when indicators displace underlying purposes or encourage gaming.

For legislative oversight, these insights suggest that more data do not necessarily produce more accountability. A hearing may contain numerous indicators yet remain weak if members cannot compare definitions, identify causal mechanisms, or trace commitments over time. Conversely, a focused set of questions can be highly consequential when it connects a target to resources, implementation constraints, citizen effects, and corrective action. The quality of oversight therefore depends partly on the quality and usability of the performance-information environment.

Indonesian evidence supports this interpretation. Muhtar et al. (2021) using data from 514 local governments, find that external audit and public monitoring positively affect performance accountability, while the effects of monitoring depend on institutional conditions. Akbar et al. (2026) find that the design and institutionalization of performance measurement and employee competence shape the use of performance information in government agencies. Earlier Indonesian accountability research also highlighted the risk that formal accountability practices may become decoupled from substantive performance improvement when compliance incentives dominate learning (Ahyaruddin & Akbar, 2017). Together, these studies justify examining legislative oversight as part of an accountability ecosystem rather than as a stand-alone event.

Hybrid Governance and Sstate-Owned Enterprises

Hybrid organizations face accountability complexity when ownership, market, public-service, and political logics coexist. Vakkuri et al. (2021) argue that hybrid organizations can be understood through ownership, institutional logics, funding, control, and value-creation arrangements. This perspective is especially relevant to SOEs and state-investment entities because performance must be interpreted across commercial and public-governance expectations rather than through a single organizational logic.

Indonesian SOEs vividly demonstrate this complexity. Recent Indonesian evidence also underlines the importance of board structure and governance design in state-owned enterprises (Umanto et al., 2022). Apriliyanti & Randøy (2019) show that boardroom decisions in Indonesian SOEs are shaped by power distribution, individual motivations, and political-governmental influence. The study warns that political interference can reduce decision quality. Another study of Indonesian SOEs identifies political-business logics and collusive dynamics that can weaken checks and balances (Apriliyanti & Randøy, 2019). These findings do not imply that political institutions should withdraw from SOE governance; they show why formal, transparent, and role-consistent accountability is preferable to informal intervention.

The corporate-governance literature further emphasizes that governance outcomes depend on institutional context rather than universal board prescriptions. Research on SOE disclosure also indicates that governance structures shape the quality and breadth of non-financial accountability, including sustainability and ESG disclosure (Argento et al., 2019; Nicolo' & Andrades-Peña, 2024; Ruiz-Lozano et al., 2021). Zattoni et al. (2020) show that national institutions shape governance mechanisms and firm outcomes. Inoue (2020) demonstrates how political cycles can affect SOE employment and financial performance, illustrating the temporal effects of political incentives on enterprise behavior. Liechti & Finger (2019) propose strategic objectives as a means of reducing arbitrary interference by providing a medium-term reference point for government and parliament. These insights are directly relevant to Indonesia's current restructuring: consolidated asset management can improve strategic coherence, but only if the boundaries between ownership policy, investment management, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary oversight, and enterprise autonomy are sufficiently clear.

Public Value and Multidimensional Performance

Strategic economic institutions create value that cannot be captured by a single financial metric. Public-value scholarship emphasizes outcomes valued by citizens and society, legitimacy and support, and operational capacity (Bryson et al., 2015; Moore, 1995). For a trade ministry, public value may involve stable markets, consumer protection, export opportunities, fair competition, and resilient supply chains. For BP Batam, it includes investment, jobs, infrastructure, efficient services, land certainty, environmental and social safeguards, and fiscal contribution. For SOEs and state-owned banks, it may include profitability, dividends, service continuity, strategic capacity, financial inclusion, and support for national priorities.

This multidimensionality creates a measurement challenge. If oversight focuses only on financial returns, it can ignore social or strategic mandates. If it focuses only on public missions, it can excuse inefficiency and financial weakness. Hybrid governance therefore requires balanced accountability: commercial discipline, legal compliance, service quality, strategic outcomes, and public value should be examined together. This article operationalizes that principle through five performance dimensions: financial stewardship, operational delivery, governance integrity, public value, and adaptive capacity.

The Oversight-to-Accountability Conversion Framework

Drawing on these literatures, the study proposes an initial analytical framework with four stages. Stage 1 is information acquisition: parliament obtains plans, budgets, targets, realization data, audit information, and explanations. Stage 2 is performance interrogation: legislators test gaps between targets and realization, examine assumptions, compare periods, and question risks or unintended effects. Stage 3 is corrective direction: the oversight forum translates concerns into recommendations, requests, deadlines, reporting requirements, or policy adjustments. Stage 4 is follow-up accountability: subsequent evidence is used to assess whether commitments were implemented and whether performance improved.

The framework assumes that oversight quality is moderated by four conditions: indicator quality, institutional role clarity, information symmetry, and continuity of follow-up. It also distinguishes democratic oversight from micromanagement. Oversight is accountability-enhancing when it defines expected results and requires explanations; it becomes potentially distortive when political actors substitute ad hoc operational preferences for established governance processes without transparent justification. This distinction provides the basis for the empirical analysis.

3. Methodology

Research Design

The study adopts a qualitative multiple-case document-analysis design. This design is consistent with recent accountability research that uses documentary evidence to reconstruct formal accountability relationships, governance expectations, and organizational responses in hybrid settings (Maine et al., 2024; Rajala & Kokko, 2021). This approach is appropriate because the research question concerns institutional processes, accountability language, performance claims, and the relationship between formal oversight and publicly documented organizational responses. It also fits the practical objective of constructing a replicable study from secondary data without relying on interviews. Document analysis is particularly useful when official meetings, performance reports, regulations, and public communications form part of the accountability process itself rather than merely serving as indirect evidence.

The unit of analysis is an oversight-accountability episode: a documented instance in which Commission VI scrutinizes a strategic economic institution and links an issue to performance, governance, budget, service, investment, or public consequences. The cases are selected purposively to represent different governance forms within the Commission VI portfolio: (1) the Ministry of Trade as a ministerial bureaucracy and regulator; (2) SOE governance and Danantara as a state-ownership and investment-management architecture; (3) BP Batam as a strategic territorial-development authority; and (4) Himbara/state-owned banking as commercially operated but publicly significant financial institutions.

Data Sources and Period

The principal empirical period is 2025 to mid-2026 because it captures the beginning of the 2024–2029 parliamentary term, the creation and early governance of Danantara, and a dense set of Commission VI oversight activities. The final empirical-corpus audit was completed on 19 August 2026. The core corpus contains 20 traceable documents: eight DPR RI/Parlementaria oversight documents, five institutional performance or official-release documents (Ministry of Trade, BP Batam, and Danantara), three established-news reports (Reuters and ANTARA), and four legal/regulatory instruments. These documents support eight focal oversight-accountability episodes used for evaluative coding. The multi-source strategy follows public-accountability research emphasizing triangulation of monitoring, performance information, governance arrangements, and formal reporting (Muhtar et al., 2021; Vakkuri et al., 2021). Background academic literature covers 2017–2026 and is analytically separate from the empirical corpus. A complete document inventory and coding trail are reported in Supplementary Tables S1–S2.

Source retrieval used targeted searches of the DPR RI/JDIH and E-Media DPR portals, the Ministry of Trade performance-report repository, BP Batam publications, Danantara official releases, the BPK/JDIH legal database, and the Reuters and ANTARA archives. Search strings combined institution names with issue terms such as ‘Komisi VI’, ‘performance/kinerja’, ‘RKAP’, ‘budget/anggaran’, ‘investment/investasi’, ‘governance/tata kelola’, ‘Himbara’, ‘Danantara’, ‘BP Batam’, ‘Kementerian Perdagangan’, ‘gula rafinasi’, ‘land/lahan’, and ‘service continuity/layanan’. Parliamentary primary documents identify oversight agendas, conclusions, recommendations, and follow-up requests; institutional documents provide performance claims and implementation evidence; legal instruments establish mandates and governance changes; and established news reports triangulate timing, externally reported figures, and market or public reactions. Exact document identities, dates, source channels, and analytical roles are listed in Supplementary Table S1.

The study does not treat media reports as equivalent to audited financial statements. Source hierarchy is maintained. Official meeting records and audited or formal institutional reports receive the greatest evidentiary weight for claims about commitments and performance. Official press releases are treated as institutional claims that require contextual reading. Credible news reports are used to corroborate timing, external reactions, and publicly reported figures. Academic studies are used for theory and interpretation rather than as evidence of 2025–2026 institutional performance.

Document Selection

Documents were selected when they met at least one of four criteria. The selection logic was informed by recent studies of performance-information use and hybrid accountability, which stress the need to distinguish substantive evidence used for monitoring and learning from information produced primarily for legitimacy or compliance (Korac et al., 2020; Nitzl et al., 2019; Siverbo et al., 2019). Documents were selected when they met at least one of four criteria: they contained an explicit Commission VI oversight interaction; reported a performance target or realization relevant to an oversight issue; documented a governance reform affecting accountability; or provided independent reporting on a material development discussed in the oversight arena. Duplicative releases, purely ceremonial reports, and sources without identifiable institutional provenance were excluded from the core corpus.

Particular attention was paid to comparability. For example, BP Batam investment figures can differ depending on methodology. The analysis therefore records the indicator definition and source rather than merging figures into a single series. Similarly, Danantara is a newly established institution, so the analysis emphasizes governance commitments, reporting arrangements, and oversight expectations rather than pretending that a long performance history exists.

Coding and Analytical Procedure

The analysis proceeded in three coding cycles. The first author conducted the primary document coding using a structured codebook derived from the OACF and five performance dimensions. The second author independently reviewed the coding decisions for all eight focal oversight-accountability episodes, while disagreements were discussed with the third author until a consensus classification was reached. A structured coding strategy was used because accountability in hybrid organizations is multidimensional and can involve financial, operational, relational, and governance logics simultaneously (Grossi et al., 2021; Vakkuri et al., 2021). The first cycle used descriptive coding to identify the object of scrutiny; the second used process coding to classify information acquisition, performance interrogation, corrective direction, and follow-up accountability; and the third applied evaluative coding to classify conversion as strong, moderate, or weak. The consensus coding matrix is reported in Supplementary Table S2.

A strong conversion episode contains a clearly defined performance issue, identifiable evidence, a specific corrective expectation, and an explicit mechanism for subsequent reporting or verification. A moderate episode contains a clear concern and corrective direction but lacks either a well-specified follow-up indicator, deadline, or documented verification mechanism. A weak episode is dominated by general statements, praise/criticism, or issue recognition without a sufficiently observable corrective-and-follow-up chain. Ratings were assigned only after source triangulation and consensus review; they evaluate the documented accountability conversion, not the political importance of an episode.

To improve analytical rigor, evidence was triangulated across source types. Triangulation was used to reduce the risk that institutional self-reporting, parliamentary claims, or isolated performance indicators would be interpreted as self-validating evidence; this is especially important where performance information can be used instrumentally, symbolically, or for legitimization (Ruiz-Lozano et al., 2021). A parliamentary statement about performance was checked against institutional reporting when available. Institutional claims were compared with credible external reporting when material. Contradictions were retained rather than harmonized. The BP Batam investment case is illustrative: different official measurement methods produce different totals, so the difference is interpreted as an accountability issue concerning indicator architecture rather than as an error to be silently corrected.

Analytical Dimensions

Five performance dimensions organize the cross-case comparison. The dimensions synthesize recent work on public-sector performance-information use, dysfunctional measurement effects, hybrid value creation, and SOE governance (Grossi et al., 2021; Zattoni et al., 2020). Financial stewardship covers budget credibility, absorption, efficiency, profitability, dividends, PNBP, and financial risk. Operational delivery covers implementation, service continuity, market supervision, infrastructure, and program outputs. Governance integrity covers transparency, auditability, role clarity, conflicts of interest, land or procurement governance, and reporting. Public value covers benefits to citizens, consumers, workers, businesses, and regions. Adaptive capacity covers the ability to respond to shocks, market changes, global trade developments, disasters, and institutional restructuring.

Table 1. Analytical Structure of the Secondary-Data Study

Case	Institutional form	Primary oversight themes	Performance dimensions
Ministry of Trade	Ministerial bureaucracy/regulator	Prices, supply, imports, trade supervision, budget	Operational delivery; governance integrity; public value
SOEs/Danantara	State ownership and investment governance	Portfolio performance, restructuring, prudence, reporting, GCG	Financial stewardship; governance integrity; adaptive capacity
BP Batam	Strategic development authority	Investment, budget absorption, PNBP, land, infrastructure, transparency	Financial stewardship; operational delivery; governance integrity; public value
Himbara	State-owned commercial banking	Service continuity, public role, reform, resilience	Operational delivery; financial stewardship; public value; adaptive capacity

(Source: Authors' synthesis from DPR RI, institutional reports/releases, and secondary-data triangulation, 2025–2026)

As summarized in Table 1, the analytical structure reflects the institutional heterogeneity of Commission VI's oversight portfolio. Rather than applying identical performance indicators across all cases, the study evaluates each institution according to its governance form, primary oversight concerns, and relevant performance dimensions. This approach enables systematic cross-case comparison while preserving the institutional specificity of ministerial, corporate, investment-governance, development-authority, and state-owned banking arrangements. The use of a case-summary matrix also enhances transparency and trustworthiness by making the basis of cross-case comparison explicit (Cloutier & Ravasi, 2021).

The approach is interpretive rather than causal. The study does not claim that a Commission VI hearing directly caused a subsequent performance change unless documentary evidence establishes such a link. Instead, it evaluates the design and observable accountability content of oversight. This boundary is important because performance is influenced by economic conditions, executive decisions, regulation, organizational capability, and market dynamics in addition to parliamentary scrutiny.

Research Quality and Trustworthiness

Credibility was strengthened through source hierarchy, cross-source triangulation, an explicit codebook, and consensus review of the eight focal episodes. Dependability was supported by documenting the retrieval date, search channels, inclusion criteria, document inventory, and coding matrix. Confirmability was enhanced by separating institutional claims from authors' interpretations and by retaining contradictory indicators rather than harmonizing them. Following Cloutier & Ravasi (2021), tabular displays are used to make the evidentiary basis of qualitative comparison visible. Supplementary Tables S1–S2 provide an auditable trail from source document to OACF stage, performance dimension, and conversion rating.

The research-quality protocol therefore focuses on transparency of evidence and analytical traceability. Empirical limitations arising from reliance on public documents, institutional heterogeneity, the observation window, causal inference, disclosure behavior, and transferability are consolidated in Section 6 rather than repeated here.

4. Findings

Overview: Oversight is Broad, but Accountability Conversion is Uneven

The documentary evidence shows that Commission VI's oversight agenda is substantively broad. It covers budget efficiency, commodity prices, import governance, corporate performance, investment, public services, institutional restructuring, and governance risks. This breadth is appropriate to the Commission's portfolio, but it creates an information-management challenge. The institutions under scrutiny do not share a single performance logic. Ministries report through government performance systems; SOEs use corporate financial and operational metrics; banks add prudential indicators; BP Batam uses public-agency, investment, infrastructure, and PNBP metrics; Danantara combines public-law responsibilities with investment-management objectives. Legislative oversight therefore operates across multiple "performance languages."

The strongest episodes occur when parliamentary scrutiny translates these different languages into a common accountability sequence: What was promised? What resources were provided? What was delivered? What explains the gap? Who benefited or bore risk? What will be corrected? What evidence will be provided next? Where one or more of these questions is absent, oversight may still be politically important but produces a weaker performance-accountability chain.

Table 2. OACF Conversion Ratings Across the Eight Focal Oversight-Accountability Episodes

Episode / case	Primary issue	Dominant OACF evidence	Conversion rating
E1 Ministry of Trade (Mar 2025)	Basic-goods price and supply stabilization	Information acquisition + performance interrogation	Moderate
E2 Ministry of Trade (Jul 2025)	Budget adequacy, import pressure, domestic-industry protection	Interrogation + corrective direction	Moderate
E3 Ministry of Trade (Oct 2025)	Refined-sugar distribution and import governance	All four stages; routine reporting requested	Strong
E4 Danantara/SOEs (Jul 2025)	RKAP, prudence, feasibility, fund monitoring, GCG	All four stages; periodic DPR reporting requested	Strong
E5 BP Batam (Feb 2025)	Batam Center ferry-terminal transparency	Issue recognition + governance direction	Weak
E6 BP Batam (Sep 2025)	2026 budget increase, absorption, citizen impact	Interrogation + corrective direction	Moderate
E7 BP Batam (Oct 2025)	Land governance, overlap, investment-area governance	Interrogation + governance direction	Moderate
E8 Himbara (Dec 2025)	Disaster service continuity and operational recovery	Interrogation + immediate corrective direction	Moderate

Note: Consensus coding yielded 2 strong, 5 moderate, and 1 weak conversion episodes. Ratings assess the documented completeness of the oversight-to-accountability chain, not overall institutional performance. Full source-level coding is provided in Supplementary Table S2.

Ministry of Trade: From Market Concern to Administrative Accountability

Commission VI's oversight of the Ministry of Trade illustrates the movement from politically salient economic problems toward administrative accountability. In March 2025, the Commission examined the ministry's readiness to stabilize prices and supplies of essential goods ahead of Ramadan and Eid (DPR RI, 2025e). This is a classic case in which performance cannot be judged by budget absorption alone. The relevant outcome is market stability, but the ministry does not control all determinants of prices. Effective accountability therefore requires attention to instruments within the ministry's authority: monitoring, distribution coordination, trade regulation, enforcement, market information, and inter-agency action.

The July 2025 budget discussion added a resource dimension. Parliamentary reporting noted concerns about import pressure, domestic-industry protection, rice distribution, export-market development, and the adequacy of the proposed budget (DPR RI, 2025b). This creates a potentially productive accountability relationship because the Commission can connect requested resources to specified policy problems. However, the quality of that relationship depends on whether future oversight returns to measurable commitments. Additional budget is not itself performance; it is an input that should be tied to outputs and outcomes.

The October 2025 refined-sugar hearing demonstrates a more specific conversion mechanism. Commission VI called for stronger distribution supervision, improved and transparent commodity-balance governance, evaluation of import approvals, sanctions for violations, and routine reporting through information systems (DPR RI, 2025f). This episode contains several features of strong accountability conversion. The problem is identifiable: leakage of refined sugar into consumer markets and disruption of price stability and absorption of domestic production. The administrative instruments are identifiable: supervision, import permits, commodity-balance data, sanctions, and reporting. The responsible organization is identifiable. The remaining question is follow-up: whether subsequent reporting demonstrates implementation and whether the underlying market problem changes.

This case also reveals the importance of information infrastructure. A commodity-balance system is not merely a technical database; it is an accountability device because import decisions depend on the credibility of supply-demand information. When legislators ask whether the system is transparent and accurate, they are scrutinizing the epistemic basis of administrative decisions. Public governance increasingly depends on such data systems. Oversight capacity therefore requires not only political judgment but also the ability to interrogate data definitions, update cycles, institutional responsibilities, and exceptions.

Ministry of Trade performance reports provide an additional accountability layer. The ministry and its Inspectorate General maintain performance-report repositories covering annual and quarterly periods, including 2025 reports (Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia, 2026). The availability of these documents improves formal transparency. Yet availability should not be confused with usability. Parliamentary accountability is strengthened when indicators in performance reports are explicitly connected to questions raised in hearings and when the same definitions are used over time. Otherwise, the system risks parallel reporting: the ministry reports one set of indicators while parliamentary debate follows a different set of political concerns.

he case therefore supports a first finding: legislative oversight is most accountability-enhancing when it converts broad public concerns into administratively controllable variables and then requires traceable evidence. Price stability, import governance, and domestic-industry protection are legitimate political objectives, but accountability becomes operational only when the oversight process identifies what the ministry can reasonably be expected to do and how performance will be verified.

SOEs and Danantara: Accountability Under Consolidated State Ownership

The creation of Danantara changes the institutional map of SOE governance and makes role clarity a central accountability issue. SOEs already embody multiple principals and objectives. The state acts as owner, policymaker, regulator, and representative of citizens, while enterprise boards and managers are expected to exercise professional judgment. Consolidating ownership and investment functions may reduce fragmentation and improve portfolio discipline, but it can also create distance between individual enterprises and traditional political-accountability channels.

Public reporting surrounding Danantara's establishment reflected both ambition and concern. Reuters described the new agency as a major state-investment vehicle intended to improve returns and performance from public assets, while noting market concern about political interference (Reuters, 2025a). Subsequent Reuters reporting on the advisory structure again highlighted efforts to build credibility alongside investor sensitivity to governance and political influence (Reuters, 2025b). These reactions matter because governance quality affects not only democratic legitimacy but also the cost of capital and confidence of market participants.

Commission VI's July 2025 oversight provides a clear example of how parliament attempted to define accountability expectations. The Commission received explanations concerning Danantara's entity structure and 2025 work plan and emphasized prudence, feasibility studies, monitoring of fund use, good corporate governance, and periodic reporting to the DPR (DPR RI, 2025g). These expectations correspond closely to the OACF stages. Information acquisition concerns the structure and plan; performance interrogation concerns the feasibility and risks of planned investments; corrective direction appears in the demand for prudence and governance safeguards; follow-up accountability is represented by periodic reporting.

The challenge is to ensure that periodic reporting does not become either superficial or operationally intrusive. Danantara requires enough managerial autonomy to make portfolio decisions in changing markets. Parliament requires enough information to evaluate whether public assets are being managed according to law, strategic objectives, risk tolerance, and public interest. The appropriate accountability object is therefore not every individual commercial choice. It is the quality of the governance system: investment mandate, portfolio objectives, risk framework, related-party safeguards, conflict-of-interest controls, valuation practices, auditability, disclosure, and aggregate performance.

Danantara's May 2026 official statement is relevant in this regard. It states that the institution's financial reporting and governance mechanisms follow the applicable legal framework, that it remains committed to transparency and accountability, and that audited financial statements are being consolidated and finalized across SOE entities within its management scope (Danantara, 2026). From an accountability perspective, this statement is a commitment rather than proof of long-term performance. The decisive test is whether reporting subsequently becomes sufficiently detailed, comparable, timely, and independently verifiable.

The SOE literature suggests why these safeguards matter. Apriliyanti and Randøy (2019) find that political and governmental power can shape boardroom decisions in Indonesian SOEs. Apriliyanti & Kristiansen (2019) identify deeper political-business logics that can weaken checks and balances. Inoue (2020) demonstrates more generally that political incentives can affect SOE behavior and performance over time. These studies caution against equating stronger political attention with better governance. Accountability must be formalized so that democratic oversight constrains abuse without substituting political discretion for professional management.

This leads to a second finding: consolidated state ownership increases the need for consolidated accountability. When assets and decision rights are reorganized, reporting systems must be reorganized as well. Otherwise, institutional consolidation can create an accountability gap in which authority becomes clearer internally but answerability becomes more diffuse externally. The governance task for Commission VI is therefore to develop portfolio-level oversight that focuses on strategic objectives, risk, aggregate returns, public mandates, and governance integrity, while reserving intervention in individual transactions for cases involving legal violations, material public risk, or explicit statutory responsibilities.

BP Batam: High Investment Performance and the Problem of Multidimensional Accountability

BP Batam provides the clearest illustration of why performance accountability must be multidimensional. Investment realization is a major indicator because the institution is expected to strengthen Batam's attractiveness as an investment and industrial location. ANTARA reported that BP Batam initially targeted Rp60 trillion in investment for 2025 and later reported strong mid-year realization (ANTARA, 2025a, 2025b). By the end of 2025, BP Batam reported Rp69.30 trillion in "real" investment using its broader methodology, exceeding the Rp60 trillion target (ANTARA, 2026). Separate LKPM-based reporting showed Rp44.01 trillion against a different target of approximately Rp36.99 trillion, also above target (BP Batam, 2026b). The institution reported strong domestic and foreign investment growth, and its 2025 performance communication linked these results to regulatory reform, infrastructure, and service improvements.

From a narrow target-attainment perspective, this is a success. From a public-governance perspective, however, at least four further questions arise. First, are indicator definitions stable and transparent? The existence of two legitimate methodologies requires clear communication so that parliament and the public do not compare non-equivalent figures. Second, what is the quality of investment? Sector composition, job creation, capital deepening, environmental effects, local linkages, and project realization matter alongside headline value. Third, what public resources and regulatory privileges support the outcome? Investment performance should be related to infrastructure expenditure, land administration, incentives, and service delivery. Fourth, what governance risks accompany rapid development?

Commission VI's oversight reflects these broader concerns. In September 2025, a parliamentary report questioned a large proposed increase in BP Batam's 2026 budget in light of historical absorption rates reportedly below the national average and asked about the impact on citizens (DPR RI, 2025h). This is an important accountability move because it resists the assumption that successful investment outcomes automatically justify larger budgets. The relevant question is marginal public value: what additional outputs and outcomes will the additional resources purchase?

Land and transparency issues create another dimension. In October 2025, Commission VI called for stronger governance innovation while also highlighting land-management problems and overlapping claims (DPR RI, 2025d). Another parliamentary report emphasized transparency, social considerations, and public scrutiny surrounding major development projects (DPR RI, 2025h). Earlier in 2025, a Commission VI member raised transparency and accountability concerns in the management of the Batam Center ferry terminal (DPR RI, 2025c). These episodes demonstrate that an investment-development authority is accountable not only for attracting capital but also for the integrity and legitimacy of the administrative processes through which development occurs.

By mid-2026, Commission VI publicly appreciated BP Batam's 2025 and first-quarter 2026 performance, including investment and PNBP, while encouraging continued governance and investment improvements. BP Batam reported PNBP of Rp1.93 trillion for 2025 and expressed confidence in maintaining an unqualified audit opinion (BP Batam, 2026a). Such recognition is legitimate, but the OACF suggests that positive oversight should remain evidence-based. Praise and criticism should both be connected to defined indicators and followed by scrutiny of sustainability, not merely point-in-time achievements.

The BP Batam case therefore yields a third finding: target achievement and accountability quality are analytically distinct. Strong performance on a headline indicator can coexist with unresolved questions about measurement, resource efficiency, process integrity, and distributional outcomes. Legislative oversight adds value when it prevents "performance success" from becoming a shield against governance scrutiny, while also avoiding the opposite error of ignoring genuine achievement because political controversy exists elsewhere.

Himbara And State-Owned Banking: Public Service Obligations within Commercial Governance

State-owned banks illustrate hybrid accountability in a sector where commercial discipline is reinforced by prudential regulation. Their primary operational environment is banking, but state ownership creates additional expectations concerning national development, financial inclusion, public-program delivery, and resilience. Commission VI's late-2025 scrutiny of Himbara service continuity in disaster-affected areas is therefore significant. Parliamentary reporting emphasized the security of customer funds, minimum service availability, and speed of operational recovery (DPR RI, 2025a).

This episode expands the meaning of performance. A bank can remain profitable while failing a public-service resilience test in a crisis. Conversely, emergency service obligations must be designed consistently with safety, prudential rules, and operational feasibility. Legislative oversight can contribute by making resilience expectations explicit and by asking for contingency indicators such as service restoration time, availability of alternative channels, cash access, cybersecurity, and coordination with disaster-response institutions.

The banking case also connects to Danantara because major state-owned banks are part of the broader state-asset architecture. This increases the importance of avoiding duplicate or conflicting accountability demands. Bank boards answer to corporate and financial-sector governance mechanisms; regulators supervise prudential soundness; state ownership structures define shareholder objectives; and parliament exercises democratic oversight. Effective public governance requires these forums to be complementary. The objective should be to identify public outcomes and systemic risks that may be insufficiently visible in ordinary corporate reporting, not to replicate bank supervision.

The fourth finding is therefore that legislative oversight is particularly valuable in hybrid organizations when it surfaces public obligations that standard commercial metrics understate. However, it should do so through outcome expectations and governance standards rather than ad hoc operational commands.

Cross-case Synthesis

Across the eight focal episodes, consensus coding classified two episodes as strong, five as moderate, and one as weak in documented oversight-to-accountability conversion (Table 2; Supplementary Table S2). The two strong episodes—the refined-sugar oversight and the Danantara RKAP/governance hearing—combined a defined issue, identifiable evidence, specific corrective expectations, and explicit reporting or verification requirements. Moderate episodes generally contained substantive interrogation and direction but lacked a fully specified follow-up indicator, deadline, or publicly traceable verification mechanism. The weak episode identified a governance concern but did not document a sufficiently complete corrective-and-follow-up chain. Across these ratings, five recurring accountability gaps emerge. The first is indicator fragmentation. Different institutions and even different units within the same institution may use different definitions, making longitudinal or cross-source comparison difficult. The second is input-output slippage: budget discussions often identify resource needs but do not always establish a visible chain from additional resources to measurable public outcomes. The third is follow-up discontinuity. Parliamentary recommendations can be specific, yet public documentation of whether each recommendation was implemented is less systematic than documentation of the initial hearing.

The fourth gap is role ambiguity. This is especially important for SOEs and Danantara, where democratic oversight must coexist with corporate autonomy. The fifth gap is public-value visibility. Financial and investment indicators are often more readily available than distributional, service-quality, environmental, or citizen-impact indicators. As a result, institutions can appear successful or unsuccessful depending on which performance dimension dominates the debate.

These gaps do not imply that Indonesia lacks accountability institutions. On the contrary, the documentary record shows active oversight, extensive reporting, audit mechanisms, and public communication. The problem is conversion: how to connect these components into a continuous accountability cycle. This observation motivates the framework developed in the discussion.

5. Discussion

From Oversight Events to an Accountability System

The central argument emerging from the findings is that legislative oversight should be evaluated as a conversion process rather than as a count of meetings, questions, or recommendations. A parliament can be highly active yet generate limited accountability if each hearing is episodic and disconnected from prior commitments. Conversely, a smaller number of well-structured oversight episodes can have greater governance value when they create an auditable chain from information to judgment to correction to follow-up.

The proposed Oversight-to-Accountability Conversion Framework (OACF) formalizes this logic. The framework begins with information acquisition. Institutions should provide standardized pre-hearing information containing mandate, strategic objectives, budget, key performance indicators, major variances, risk exposures, audit findings, and the status of previous parliamentary recommendations. This stage reduces information asymmetry and prevents hearings from being dominated by basic fact-finding.

The second stage, performance interrogation, asks whether results are credible and meaningful. Legislators should distinguish target attainment from outcome quality, interrogate denominator and methodology changes, and examine trade-offs among performance dimensions. The BP Batam investment case demonstrates why these matters. Two investment figures can both be valid when they reflect different methodologies, but accountability requires the methodology to be explicit. Similarly, trade outcomes must be interpreted in relation to global prices, exchange rates, domestic production, and policy instruments rather than attributed mechanically to one ministry.

The third stage, corrective direction, converts scrutiny into action. Recommendations should identify the responsible actor, required action, expected evidence, and reporting period. This does not require parliament to manage operations. It requires clarity about what the accountable institution must explain or improve. The refined-sugar hearing is a useful model because the parliamentary conclusions identify concrete administrative instruments: supervision, commodity-balance governance, permit evaluation, sanctions, and routine reporting.

The fourth stage, follow-up accountability, is the most important and often the least visible. Every material recommendation should have a status in the next relevant oversight cycle: completed, in progress, delayed, rejected with justification, or superseded. Performance effects should be reported when measurable. This converts institutional memory from a collection of documents into a governance mechanism.

Balancing Democratic Oversight and Managerial Autonomy

The OACF also addresses the risk of political micromanagement. The SOE literature demonstrates that political intervention can reduce decision quality when it bypasses formal governance structures (Apriliyanti & Kristiansen, 2019; Apriliyanti & Randøy, 2019). Yet the solution cannot be insulation from democratic scrutiny because SOEs and Danantara manage public assets and pursue public objectives. The governance challenge is to separate "what and why" oversight from "how" management.

Parliament should be strong on mandate, objectives, risk tolerance, integrity, transparency, public value, and evaluation. Boards and professional managers should retain authority over ordinary commercial execution within that framework. Intervention becomes justified when execution violates law, departs materially from approved objectives, exposes public assets to unacceptable risk, or reveals governance failure. This division resembles the logic of strategic objectives described by Liechti & Finger (2019): medium-term objectives can provide a stable reference point that disciplines both managers and political actors.

For Danantara, this implies that Commission VI oversight should prioritize portfolio-level indicators. Relevant measures include risk-adjusted return, dividend and value creation, leverage, concentration risk, related-party exposure, capital allocation discipline, governance compliance, audit findings, realization of strategic investments, and public-policy mandates. Transaction-level detail may be necessary for exceptional cases, but routine parliamentary accountability should not become an alternative investment committee.

Performance Accountability as Public-Value Accountability

The findings support a broader interpretation of performance. New Public Management reforms often strengthened attention to measurable outputs, efficiency, and results. However, strategic economic institutions operate in settings where measurable financial outcomes can conflict with or fail to capture public value. A trade policy can improve aggregate export performance while imposing adjustment costs on particular sectors. An investment authority can attract capital while generating land conflict. A bank can report strong profitability while service continuity fails during a disaster. An SOE can increase dividends while underinvesting in long-term strategic capacity.

Public-value accountability therefore requires a balanced scorecard of public consequences. This does not mean every institution should be responsible for every social outcome. Attribution boundaries remain essential. It means that oversight should ask whether institutional objectives reflect the full mandate and whether major externalities are visible in reporting. Bryson et al. (2015) emphasize the importance of public value in governance beyond narrow organizational performance. Moore's (1995) strategic triangle similarly links public value, legitimacy and support, and operational capacity. Applied to Commission VI, the framework suggests that performance questions should connect organizational capability to authorized public purposes and stakeholder effects.

Information Architecture as Governance Infrastructure

A major practical implication is that accountability quality increasingly depends on information architecture. Performance systems, commodity-balance databases, investment dashboards, financial reports, audit systems, and parliamentary records are not neutral technical tools. They structure what can be seen, compared, questioned, and verified. Poorly designed indicators can create blind spots; inconsistent definitions can generate confusion; inaccessible data can increase information asymmetry.

The Ministry of Trade case shows how the accuracy and transparency of commodity-balance information affect import governance. BP Batam's multiple investment methodologies show why metadata and definitions should accompany headline figures. Danantara's consolidation highlights the importance of harmonized financial reporting across a large portfolio. Himbara resilience oversight suggests the need for operational-continuity metrics that are not always central to ordinary financial reporting.

This argument aligns with performance-management research. Nitzl et al. (2019) show that monitoring and attention-focusing uses of performance information can support organizational performance, while other uses may not. Korac et al. (2020) show that legitimizing uses can coexist with purposeful uses. Akbar et al. (2026) demonstrate that system design, institutionalization, and competence influence performance-information use in Indonesian agencies. For parliament, this means analytical capacity is as important as formal access. Oversight staff need the ability to interpret financial statements, performance indicators, risk reports, and sector-specific data.

A Proposed Legislative Performance Accountability Matrix

To operationalize the OACF, the study proposes a Legislative Performance Accountability Matrix. For each strategic institution, the matrix should contain: mandate and strategic objectives; approved budget or capital base; five to ten core performance indicators; major risks; audit and governance findings; previous Commission VI recommendations; management responses; follow-up status; and public-value indicators. The matrix should be updated before each major hearing.

The matrix would improve continuity across parliamentary sessions and reduce dependence on individual memory. It would also help distinguish recurring structural problems from one-off controversies. For example, if BP Batam budget absorption is repeatedly questioned, the matrix can show the five-year trend, reasons for variance, project composition, and relationship to investment and infrastructure outcomes. If Danantara is required to report periodically, the matrix can track whether reporting covers the same risk and return indicators over time. If the Ministry of Trade is asked to improve import supervision, the matrix can record enforcement actions, data-system changes, and market outcomes.

Such a tool would not eliminate politics from oversight, nor should it. Parliamentary oversight is inherently political because legislators represent citizens and contest policy priorities. The purpose of the matrix is to make political judgment better informed and more traceable.

Theoretical Contribution

The study contributes to accountability theory by specifying an intermediate mechanism between oversight and performance. Much research treats monitoring as an independent variable and accountability or performance as an outcome. The OACF argues that the relationship is conditional on conversion quality. Oversight must pass through information acquisition, interrogation, corrective direction, and follow-up. Failure at any stage weakens the chain.

The framework also contributes to hybrid-governance scholarship. Hybridity is often analyzed inside organizations, especially through competing institutional logics. This study extends hybridity to the accountability environment. Strategic economic institutions are surrounded by hybrid accountability forums: political, administrative, corporate, audit, market, regulatory, and public. Performance problems can arise not only because organizations contain competing logics but also because accountability forums demand different things using different time horizons and indicators.

Finally, the study contributes to public-value research by showing how legislative oversight can serve as a forum for broadening performance definitions. Corporate and administrative systems may prioritize what is easiest to quantify. Parliament can legitimately introduce distributional, regional, consumer, worker, resilience, and long-term strategic concerns. The challenge is to translate these concerns into measurable and role-consistent accountability rather than leave them as rhetorical claims.

Implications for Indonesia's Strategic Economic Governance

For Commission VI, the practical priority is to institutionalize follow-up. Meeting conclusions should be coded into a recommendation register linked to responsible institutions and subsequent evidence. The register should distinguish requests for information from recommendations for action and from matters requiring legislative change.

For the Ministry of Trade, parliamentary oversight should integrate performance reports with market-governance issues. Indicators should connect regulatory actions and supervision to outcomes such as distribution compliance, consumer protection, export diversification, and domestic-market stability, while explicitly acknowledging external economic factors.

For BP Batam, investment reporting should consistently disclose methodology and separate administrative investment realization, broader real-investment measures, commitments, and realized capital expenditure. Budget, PNBP, infrastructure delivery, licensing service times, land governance, job creation, and environmental-social safeguards should be considered together.

For Danantara and SOEs, accountability should be consolidated at the portfolio level while preserving enterprise-level governance. Parliament should receive standardized information on objectives, portfolio risk, returns, capital allocation, governance, audit, and strategic mandates. Periodic reporting promised in oversight forums should use stable definitions so trends can be evaluated.

For Himbara, performance accountability should include resilience and public-service dimensions alongside commercial and prudential performance. Disaster continuity is one example; financial inclusion, support for productive sectors, cybersecurity, and service accessibility are others.

Boundary Conditions and Risks

The OACF is not a claim that stronger oversight always improves performance. Several boundary conditions matter. First, legislators may have incomplete or partisan incentives. Second, performance outcomes can be affected by shocks beyond institutional control. Third, excessive reporting can create administrative burden and encourage defensive behavior. Fourth, public disclosure may need limits where commercial confidentiality, market sensitivity, or banking secrecy legitimately applies. Fifth, frequent changes in indicators can make long-term accountability impossible.

The framework therefore requires proportionality. Oversight intensity should correspond to public risk, fiscal exposure, strategic importance, and evidence of governance problems. Reporting should be standardized but not indiscriminate. Confidential information can be handled through appropriate parliamentary procedures while aggregate accountability remains public.

The ultimate objective is not maximum scrutiny but effective answerability: institutions should know what they are expected to achieve, decision-makers should have appropriate autonomy, parliament should have credible information to judge performance, and citizens should be able to see whether public authority and public assets are producing defensible value.

6. Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations that delimit the interpretation of its findings. First, the analysis relies exclusively on publicly accessible secondary documents. Parliamentary records, performance reports, official releases, legal instruments, and reputable news reports provide a strong basis for reconstructing formal accountability, but they cannot fully capture informal bargaining, closed-door deliberation, internal managerial reasoning, or interpersonal power relations. This limitation is particularly relevant for SOEs and hybrid organizations, where accountability may be constructed through interactions that are not visible in formal records (Maine et al., 2024). Consequently, the study evaluates documented accountability rather than claiming to observe the complete political-administrative process.

Second, the cases are institutionally heterogeneous. The Ministry of Trade, BP Batam, Danantara/SOEs, and Himbara operate under different legal mandates, reporting systems, market exposures, and governance arrangements. The cross-case comparison is therefore analytical rather than based on identical performance indicators. This heterogeneity is theoretically useful because it reveals the complexity of hybrid accountability, but it limits direct numerical comparison across institutions (Grossi et al., 2021). Future studies could develop institution-specific longitudinal panels and compare standardized accountability dimensions rather than raw performance values.

Third, the empirical window of 2025 to mid-2026 captures an unusually dynamic period of institutional change, especially the early development of Danantara. The evidence is therefore stronger for evaluating emerging governance commitments, oversight expectations, and reporting architecture than for assessing long-run investment performance. Future research should revisit Danantara after several cycles of audited financial reporting and portfolio disclosure are available.

Fourth, the study does not establish a causal effect of legislative oversight on institutional performance. Changes in trade outcomes, investment, corporate returns, service continuity, or budget execution are also shaped by executive decisions, regulation, macroeconomic conditions, global markets, organizational capability, and exogenous shocks. The OACF is therefore a process framework for evaluating accountability conversion, not proof that parliamentary scrutiny mechanically improves performance (Akbar et al., 2026; Muhtar et al., 2021).

Fifth, public reporting itself may contain symbolic or legitimizing elements. The existence of a report, dashboard, disclosure, or parliamentary response does not guarantee substantive organizational learning. Performance information and disclosure can serve purposeful management as well as legitimacy functions (Korac et al., 2020; Nicolo' & Andrades-Peña, 2024). Future studies should distinguish disclosure quality from disclosure volume and examine whether recommendations lead to observable changes in decisions, controls, services, or outcomes.

Finally, the study focuses on Commission VI and selected strategic economic institutions. The OACF and Legislative Performance Accountability Matrix may be transferable to other parliamentary commissions or emerging economies, but such transfer should be tested rather than assumed. Comparative research involving other policy sectors, legislatures, sovereign investment institutions, and SOE systems would help identify which elements are context-specific and which represent more general mechanisms of democratic performance accountability.

7. Conclusion

This study examined legislative oversight and performance accountability in Indonesia's strategic economic institutions through a public-governance perspective. Using secondary evidence from parliamentary records, institutional performance information, official releases, regulations, credible news reporting, and recent peer-reviewed scholarship, it compared oversight dynamics involving the Ministry of Trade, SOE governance and Danantara, BP Batam, and state-owned banking.

The analysis shows that Commission VI oversight addresses substantive dimensions of economic governance, including budgets, commodity markets, corporate performance, investment, public services, governance integrity, and institutional restructuring. The key analytical issue, however, is not the quantity of oversight activity. It is whether oversight is converted into accountability. The strongest episodes connect a defined problem to evidence, identify an administratively or managerially relevant response, and establish a basis for follow-up. Weakness arises when indicators are fragmented, resource debates are disconnected from outcomes, recommendations lack visible follow-up, institutional roles are ambiguous, or public-value effects remain outside formal performance systems.

The Ministry of Trade case demonstrates how oversight can convert broad market concerns into specific expectations concerning supervision, permits, information systems, and enforcement. The Danantara case shows that consolidation of state ownership and investment management increases the importance of portfolio-level democratic accountability and role clarity. The BP Batam case demonstrates that strong headline investment performance should be assessed alongside budget efficiency, indicator methodology, land governance, transparency, and distributional effects. The Himbara case shows why hybrid public-commercial organizations require public-service and resilience indicators in addition to conventional financial performance.

The article's principal conceptual contribution is the Oversight-to-Accountability Conversion Framework. The framework identifies four linked stages: information acquisition, performance interrogation, corrective direction, and follow-up accountability. It further argues that conversion quality depends on indicator quality, information symmetry, institutional role clarity, and continuity. This framework helps reconcile two legitimate but potentially conflicting objectives: strong democratic oversight and sufficient managerial autonomy.

For practice, the article proposes a Legislative Performance Accountability Matrix that links mandates, resources, indicators, risks, audit findings, parliamentary recommendations, institutional responses, and follow-up status. Such a mechanism could improve institutional memory, reduce repetitive fact-finding, and make oversight more evidence-based without depoliticizing parliament's legitimate representative role.

Future research should extend the analysis in three directions. First, longitudinal studies should track specific Commission VI recommendations across multiple years to test whether follow-up intensity is associated with measurable changes in institutional behavior. Second, comparative research could examine oversight of strategic economic institutions in other emerging economies with sovereign investment funds or large SOE sectors. Third, quantitative text analysis could code parliamentary transcripts at scale to identify changes in the content, tone, and performance orientation of oversight. For Danantara in particular, future research should revisit the accountability architecture once several years of audited portfolio-level performance data are available.

The broader conclusion is that performance accountability in strategic economic governance cannot be secured by corporate governance, administrative reporting, audit, or parliamentary oversight in isolation. It emerges from the interaction among these mechanisms. Legislative oversight creates the greatest public value when it does not merely demand more information or more compliance, but converts evidence into clear expectations, correction, and verifiable learning over time.

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