Policy Implementation and Inter-Institutional Coordination in Indonesia’s Industrial Downstreaming Governance: A Public Administration Perspective

Abstract

Indonesia’s industrial downstreaming agenda depends on the government’s capacity to coordinate policies across ministerial, sectoral, territorial, and public–private boundaries. This study examines how policy implementation and inter-institutional coordination can be understood in Indonesia’s industrial downstreaming governance from a public administration perspective. The study uses qualitative document analysis combined with a purposive, theory-led integrative literature synthesis. The documentary corpus comprises Indonesian industrial laws and planning instruments, selected policy documents, and peer-reviewed scholarship on policy coordination, policy integration, collaborative governance, policy capacity, and implementation. The synthesis identifies six interrelated analytical findings: strategic–instrument misalignment, mandate multiplicity, coordination treated as episodic rather than infrastructural, capacity asymmetry, fragmented accountability, and insufficient adaptive learning. These six findings are subsequently consolidated into five dimensions of the Integrated Strategic Industry Coordination (ISIC) Framework: strategic alignment, institutional role clarity, coordination infrastructure, implementation capacity, and adaptive accountability. Fragmented accountability and adaptive learning are combined because monitoring becomes consequential only when performance information generates institutional learning and policy adjustment. ISIC is presented as an integrative diagnostic framework rather than a new causal theory or an empirically validated model. Its contribution lies in translating several established public-administration perspectives into a sector-specific diagnostic architecture for identifying where cross-institutional implementation may break down. The study offers implications for executive coordination, policy implementation, and legislative oversight while explicitly limiting its empirical claims to industrial downstreaming governance and the documentary evidence analyzed.