

Research Article

Beyond Repression: Reorienting Samapta Authority in Brawl Control in West Java

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Abstract. Brawls in West Java represent a persistent form of collective street crime that threatens public order, child protection, and police legitimacy. This article examines Samapta's legal role in preventing brawls and identifies barriers affecting its implementation. Using empirical juridical research with statutory, conceptual, and socio-legal approaches, the study collects primary data through interviews, operational observations, and institutional documents from the West Java Regional Police, supported by secondary legal and academic sources. Data were analyzed qualitatively using authority theory and Soerjono Soekanto's five-factor model of legal effectiveness, with triangulation to strengthen validity. The findings indicate that Samapta's authority is normatively comprehensive based on police laws, organizational regulations, and operational procedures. However, implementation remains uneven due to the dominance of repressive measures, limited resources, communication constraints, and weak post-operation accountability. Barriers involve legal substance, personnel capacity, facilities, community participation, and violent subcultures. The study argues that brawl control requires a shift from incident suppression toward preventive governance through procedural accountability, integrated communication, community-based early warning systems, peace education, and responsive police regulations. This article proposes an ecosystem model integrating patrol, crowd control, public trust, and cultural transformation as interconnected elements of street-crime governance.

Keywords: Brawls; Legal Effectiveness; Police Authority; Samapta Directorate; Street Crime.

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1. Introduction

Brawls (tawuran) in West Java can no longer be understood as episodic disturbances of public order. The phenomenon is a form of collective street crime that combines physical violence, group identity, mass mobilization, and the use of public space as an arena of social contestation. In the undergraduate thesis on which this article is based, brawls are classified as street crime because they occur in public spaces, produce collective anxiety, and require a rapid police response. The research data record more than 1,200 incidents of brawls and public-order disturbances in West Java during 2019-2023, while the Samapta Directorate of the West Java Regional Police handled no fewer than 234 brawl incidents in 2022. These figures show that brawls are not merely a problem of criminality, but also a problem of urban and peri-urban security governance.

The West Java context reveals a distinctive complexity. The province has the largest population in Indonesia, with the West Java Statistics Agency estimating around 50.759 million residents in 2025 across 27 regencies and cities with highly diverse territorial characteristics (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Barat, 2025). Population density, high

mobility, socio-economic inequality, peri-urban expansion, and intense intergroup interaction create a social space that is vulnerable to horizontal conflict. These conditions make a purely repressive policing approach inadequate, because dispersing a crowd resolves the incident but does not disrupt the social mechanisms that cause brawls to recur.

The Samapta Directorate of the West Java Regional Police occupies a strategic position in responding to this problem. Institutionally, Samapta is an implementing element of the National Police's core duties at the regional police level, directly linked to maintaining public security and order, patrols, crowd control, guarding, escorting, and first action at crime scenes. The current organizational framework of regional police units can no longer be referred to solely through Chief of Police Regulation Number 22 of 2010, because the regional police structure has been updated through Indonesian National Police Regulation Number 14 of 2018 as amended by Police Regulation Number 3 of 2024 and Police Regulation Number 6 of 2025. This regulatory development is important for a journal article because it demonstrates the need for an up-to-date reading of authority rather than a mere repetition of normative references from the thesis.

The urgency of this research lies in the paradox between the completeness of legal authority and the limits of empirical effectiveness. On paper, the Samapta Directorate has a strong legal basis to act through the Police Law, crowd-control regulations, and rules on the use of force. The latest amendment through Law Number 5 of 2026 further strengthens the principles of professionalism, proportionality, transparency, accountability, oversight, and human-rights education within police training (Republik Indonesia, 2026). However, the persistently high frequency of brawls, response-time limitations, fragmented communication, and civil-society criticism of procedures for the use of force show that the core problem is not the absence of authority, but the suboptimal way in which authority is implemented.

Previous studies have examined student brawls, police discretion, the handling of mass action, and human-rights challenges in repressive police action (Fauzi, 2019; Kurniawan, 2020; Pertiwi, 2021; Utami, 2018). Most of these studies remain sectoral: they limit the object to a particular city, focus on students, or place the police primarily as actors in post-incident enforcement. Few studies have combined legal-authority analysis with empirical factors of legal effectiveness at the level of the Samapta Directorate as a provincial coordinating actor. This article fills that gap by examining how Samapta's authority operates within an ecosystem of law, organization, facilities, society, and culture.

Based on this background, the article answers two research questions. First, how does the Samapta Directorate of the West Java Regional Police perform its role in controlling brawls as a form of street crime under the applicable and updated laws and regulations? Second, what barriers affect the effectiveness of that role, and what efforts should be prioritized? The article aims to formulate the argument that the reform of brawl control must shift from a logic of incident dispersal toward preventive governance grounded in accountable authority, cross-sectoral coordination, and the building of public trust.

Theoretically, this issue also touches on the relationship between the rule of law and public security. The rule of law requires every action by state agents to rest on lawful authority, while public security demands rapid responses to situations that may change within minutes. This tension between legality and speed is most visible in brawl control. If officers arrive late, the risk of casualties and damage increases; if officers use force too quickly without adequate stages, legal legitimacy weakens. For this reason, brawl control is an appropriate arena for testing whether police law operates as an instrument of protection rather than merely an instrument of public-order enforcement.

Brawls also differ from individual street crimes. Participants often act not only as individuals, but as members of groups seeking solidarity, reputation, and recognition. This collective motive means that individual enforcement after an incident does not always break the cycle of conflict. When one perpetrator is processed, the group may interpret legal action as humiliation or as a trigger for retaliation. Therefore, controlling brawls requires a combination of legal action against perpetrators, mapping of group networks, community mediation, and social interventions that prevent the regeneration of violence.

In the context of a journal article, transforming a thesis into a scientific manuscript requires a shift in argumentative style. A thesis commonly presents lengthy accounts of legal bases and definitions, whereas a journal article must present a sharp thesis, a clear academic position, and a contribution to scholarly debate. This article therefore does not merely summarize the thesis; it reformulates its findings into a central argument: the authority of the Samapta Directorate is relatively adequate, but its effectiveness is determined by the organization's ability to translate that authority into measurable, accountable, and publicly trusted prevention.

2. Literature Review

Literature on police authority places legality as the principal prerequisite for state action. In administrative law, authority does not merely mean the power to act; it also includes legal basis, limits of action, procedures, and responsibility. Taib (2019) emphasizes that sources of authority may take the form of attribution, delegation, and mandate. In the policing context, attribution derives from statutes, while delegation and technical regulation derive from more operational internal regulations. Mattalatta (2019) adds that errors in exercising authority may generate distinctions between official responsibility and the personal responsibility of officers.

The authority of the Samapta Directorate must be read as public authority that both empowers and limits. Law Number 2 of 2002 assigns the National Police the core duties of maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection, guidance, and service to the community. The amendment through Law Number 5 of 2026 reaffirms the agenda of professionalism, proportionality, transparency, accountability, and oversight. Conceptually, this development strengthens the view that police action should not be measured only by success in calming disturbances, but also by procedural compliance and respect for human rights. In the policing literature, procedural compliance is a foundation of legitimacy that determines whether the public views police action as lawful and worthy of obedience (Li et al., 2024).

Literature on street crime and brawls emphasizes that street violence is a phenomenon that cannot be fully reduced to individual acts. Nasution (2020) shows that contemporary brawls have layered typologies, ranging from student brawls, inter-community clashes, motorcycle-gang violence, to conflicts triggered by digital narratives. Susetyo (2018) emphasizes that a student-brawl prevention model will not be effective without the involvement of schools, families, and local communities. Soyomukti (2020) even views brawls as part of a violent subculture in certain groups, so legal intervention must reach identities, symbols, and mechanisms for reproducing values within those groups.

Digital development complicates patterns of collective violence. Social media functions not only as a channel of communication, but also as a space for provocation, identity formation, displays of courage, and action coordination. Utami (2022) notes that the challenges faced by the National Police in the digital era cannot be solved by conventional patrol patterns. International literature on youth violence also emphasizes that the relationship between online conflict and offline violence is increasingly close, so prevention requires digital literacy, accountable monitoring, and collaboration with families and educational institutions (UNODC, 2023). Therefore, quick response that relies only on physical presence is insufficient without the capacity to read digital signs and build an early-warning system.

Soerjono Soekanto's theory of legal effectiveness is relevant for bridging normative and empirical analysis. The five factors that influence legal effectiveness - legal substance, law enforcers, facilities and infrastructure, society, and culture - show that law works through an ecosystem. In the Samapta context, good law does not automatically produce effective brawl control if personnel are not sufficiently trained, patrol facilities are inadequate, the community does not trust the police, or violent culture continues to be reproduced. This framework is consistent with Ali's (2019) argument that police authority should be read as a continuum from prevention to enforcement, not as a stand-alone menu of repressive actions.

The research gap offered by this article is the integration of authority theory and legal-effectiveness theory. Studies of authority tend to stop at the legal basis of action, while studies of legal effectiveness often do not sufficiently examine the structure of authority that legitimizes operational action. This article combines the two: first, by examining whether the Samapta Directorate has lawful and adequate authority; second, by assessing why that lawful authority has not yet produced optimal effectiveness. This conceptual framework produces an ecosystem model in which patrols, crowd control, use of force, cross-sectoral coordination, accountability, and public trust must be seen as mutually dependent elements.

Police discretion is an important concept in brawl control because written rules cannot anticipate every variation in field situations. However, discretion is not freedom without limits. It must be exercised within a legal space determined by the purpose of authority, the principle of proportionality, the principle of necessity, and post-action accountability. Anggara (2018) warns that discretion in handling street crime often becomes a vulnerable point because urgent situations may encourage officers to take action that is practically effective but legally problematic. In the Samapta context, the boundary between lawful discretion and *ultra vires* action must be translated into operational SOPs that field personnel can easily understand.

Literature on the use of force emphasizes staged action. Sairin (2018) & Hendrik (2020) both show that lawful crowd control is measured not only by the final result, but also by the stages of force used. This principle is relevant to brawls because the masses involved cannot always be treated in the same way as peaceful demonstrations or ordinary crowds. Some participants may carry sharp weapons and endanger public safety, while others may merely be present at the location. Such risk differentiation requires situational training so that police action is not over-inclusive and does not expand victimization.

Literature on police accountability shows that post-operation evaluation cannot stop at success reports. Gunawan & Kristian (2019) emphasize that a democratic rule-of-law state requires procedural accountability that can be reviewed. In brawl control, evaluation must record who gave orders, what stages were taken, what equipment was used, the reasons for using force, the condition of victims, and follow-up for detained perpetrators. Without such documentation, the organization struggles to learn from previous operations and the public struggles to assess whether police action was proportional.

In criminological literature, the prevention of collective violence is often understood as the product of layered intervention. Primary intervention targets broad communities through peace education and the strengthening of youth-expression spaces. Secondary intervention targets vulnerable groups and high-risk areas through risk mapping. Tertiary intervention targets repeat perpetrators through guidance, legal processing, and restoration of social relations. This model helps position the Samapta Directorate not only as a tertiary actor that arrives after a brawl has occurred, but also as part of primary and secondary intervention through patrols, community presence, and coordination with schools.

The concept of public trust must also be read operationally. Public trust is not simply a positive institutional image; it is a security resource. When people trust the police, they are more willing to report potential conflicts, act as witnesses, comply with instructions, and accept mediation. When trust is low, communities tend to remain silent, protect perpetrators, or resolve conflicts on their own. Meliala (2021) shows that police transformation in the democratic era depends heavily on the National Police's ability to build relationships with citizens that are not only hierarchical, but also dialogical. This relationship is especially important in brawl-prone areas.

3. Materials and Method

This study uses an empirical juridical method with statutory, conceptual, and socio-legal approaches. The statutory approach is used to examine the legal basis of Samapta's authority, including the Police Law, recent regulatory amendments, regional police organizational regulations, crowd-control guidelines, and rules on the use of force. The conceptual approach is used to build an understanding of authority, discretion, *ultra vires*, legal effectiveness, and street crime. The socio-legal approach is used to read how these norms work in the operational reality of brawl control.

Primary data in the study derive from the design of in-depth interviews, operational observation, and institutional documents related to the performance of the Samapta Directorate of the West Java Regional Police. Relevant informants include Samapta officials, quick-response patrol personnel, related units at district police level, and community figures in brawl-prone areas. Secondary data consist of laws and regulations, police regulations, official reports, administrative-law literature, policing literature, criminological studies, and recent scholarly articles. In the conversion into a journal article, the literature is strengthened with recent references so that the manuscript does not simply reproduce the thesis, but positions the findings within a broader academic discourse.

Data collection techniques include document study, semi-structured interviews, and limited observation of work patterns accessible without disrupting police operations. Document study is used to map authority, performance indicators, and institutional design. Interviews are directed at obtaining field experiences regarding response time, use of force, coordination, facility constraints, and relations with the community. Observation is used to read the operational context, such as fleet readiness, briefing patterns, communication flows, and task distribution.

Data analysis is conducted qualitatively through three stages. First, data reduction sorts information according to the two research questions. Second, data are categorized using authority theory and Soerjono Soekanto's five factors of legal effectiveness. Third, conclusions are drawn argumentatively by distinguishing results from discussion. Validity is maintained through source triangulation and method triangulation by comparing findings from documents, interviews, and observation. Reliability is maintained through consistent

analytical categories and explicit indicators, such as indicators of legal authority, procedural compliance, adequacy of facilities, quality of coordination, and community participation.

The limitation of this study lies in access to police operational data, not all of which is publicly available. Therefore, this article does not claim to measure effectiveness through statistical causality. The claim advanced is juridical-empirical and argumentative: it assesses the relationship between the structure of authority, available institutional data, and identified implementation barriers. This limitation does not reduce the contribution of the article because its focus is to formulate a framework for institutional improvement that can be tested further by quantitative or comparative research.

The choice of an empirical juridical method is based on the nature of the problem, which cannot be answered through purely normative research. If the study only reads regulations, the conclusion would tend to state that the authority of the National Police is available and lawful. Yet the problem of brawls emerges precisely at the stage where authority operates. Empirical methods are therefore necessary to see whether norms are understood by personnel, whether facilities support norms, whether the community responds to police action, and whether local culture supports or obstructs prevention.

In analyzing the data, this article distinguishes between results and discussion. The results section presents only the identified findings, such as the legal basis of authority, patrol patterns, resource barriers, and the mapping of legal-effectiveness factors. The discussion section then interprets those findings through theory and literature. This distinction is important because many legal theses combine results and discussion descriptively, whereas reputable journal articles require a more analytical and transparent structure.

Research ethics are observed by not disclosing operational information that could endanger personnel, informants, or the community. Information about patrol patterns, high-risk points, and specific procedures is treated generally, not as technical detail that can be misused. This principle is important in police-law research because academic openness must be balanced with the protection of public security and the safety of research subjects.

4. Results and Discussion

The research results show that the legal basis of the Samapta Directorate's authority in brawl control consists of three layers. The first layer is attributive authority derived from the Police Law. This layer gives the National Police the basis to maintain public security and order, enforce the law, and provide protection to the community. The second layer is delegative and technical authority through organizational regulations and operational police regulations. The third layer is the operationalization of authority through quick-response patrols, crowd control, securing locations, first action at the scene, and coordination with other units.

Within the organizational framework, a key finding of this article is the need to update normative references. Chief of Police Regulation Number 22 of 2010, often used as a basis for the regional police structure, is no longer sufficient as the main reference because it has been replaced by Police Regulation Number 14 of 2018 and subsequently amended through Police Regulation Number 3 of 2024 and Police Regulation Number 6 of 2025. This update does not change the general position of the Samapta Directorate as an implementing element for maintaining security and order, but it strengthens the need to harmonize institutional analysis with the latest organizational design of the National Police.

On the operational aspect, quick-response patrol is the main instrument because it combines pre-emptive, preventive, repressive, and coordinative functions. This system is designed to respond to reports of public-security disturbances with a response-time target of 5-15 minutes. The research findings show that this target depends on five components: an integrated reporting system, mapping of high-risk zones, readiness of mobile patrol units, command-and-communication systems, and procedures for first action. Weakness in one component affects the overall effectiveness of patrols.

The research also identifies three operational problems in quick response. First, the ratio of patrol fleets to territorial size remains imbalanced, especially in peri-urban and rural areas with limited road access. Second, communication systems remain fragmented among call centers, command centers, field units, and community reporting channels. Third, there are disparities in first-action competence among personnel and across areas. These disparities are important because patrol personnel often arrive before other units, so their initial decisions determine the direction of subsequent handling.

In the area of crowd control, the findings show that regulations on crowd control and the use of force already provide escalation stages and proportionality standards. However, in brawl situations that change rapidly, stages of negotiation and persuasion risk being bypassed

in favor of dispersal or enforcement. This result indicates a gap between written procedures and field situations. The gap is not always caused by an intention to violate procedure, but also by limited time, safety risks, public pressure, and the absence of sufficiently detailed situational SOPs for different types of brawls.

Coordination findings show that the Samapta Directorate does not work alone. In handling brawls, the Directorate interacts with the General Criminal Investigation Directorate for criminal follow-up, the Traffic Directorate for traffic-flow management, district and sector police units for territorial reach, local government, public-order officers, schools, and community leaders. The coordination framework exists, but its implementation is often reactive. Cross-sectoral forums tend to become active after major incidents, while preventive coordination is not always structured as a regular agenda based on risk data.

The findings regarding barriers are summarized in the following table. The table is not intended as final interpretation, but as a systematic presentation of data found on the basis of the five factors of legal effectiveness.

Table 1. Mapping of Barrier Findings and Priority Measures.

Factor	Severity of Barrier	Finding	Priority Measure	Horizon
Legal substance	Moderate	No specific regulation on street crime; operational regulations need digital adaptation.	Regulatory harmonization; specific SOPs for brawls and quick response.	3-5 years
Law enforcers	High	Personnel ratio, training disparity, integrity, and leadership continuity.	Equalized training; procedural-compliance audits; strengthened accountability.	1-3 years
Facilities/infrastructure	High	Limited fleet, fragmented communication, uneven availability of human-rights-friendly crowd-control equipment.	Command-center integration; renewal of fleet and non-lethal equipment; crime mapping.	1-2 years
Society	High	Low legal awareness, weak early reporting, and uneven public trust.	Bhabinkamtibmas, safe reporting channels, community dialogue, transparent response.	3-10 years
Culture	Very high	Violent subcultures, erosion of peaceful local values, and perception of police as adversaries.	Peace education, revitalization of local values, community-based anti-violence campaigns.	10-20 years

Based on the table, the research results show that the largest barriers do not lie in a single factor. The factors of law enforcers, facilities, society, and culture are at high to very high levels of barrier. The legal factor is in the moderate category because the basic authority framework already exists, although it requires updating and harmonization. In other words, the data show that the brawl problem in West Java cannot be solved only by adding personnel or enacting new rules; both must be placed within a broader institutional strategy.

The final finding concerns performance indicators. Institutional documents and narratives tend to present repressive indicators more easily, such as the number of operations, the number of perpetrators secured, or the number of locations dispersed. By contrast, preventive indicators - such as the quality of community meetings, the number of potential brawls successfully prevented, increased early reporting, or reduced repeated conflict in assisted areas - do not always appear as primary indicators. This result shows a bias in performance measurement that affects the orientation of action.

The research results show a gap between output data and outcome data. Outputs are easier to record in the form of the number of operations, secured locations, detained perpetrators, or patrol activities. Outcomes are more difficult to record because they relate to reduced repeated conflict, increased feelings of safety, and expanded early reporting. This gap

affects how the organization understands success. When repressive output becomes the dominant measure, pre-emptive and preventive programs risk being viewed as additional activities rather than the core of brawl control.

Another finding shows that brawl-case settlement does not always end in formal legal proceedings. In the thesis data, only about 38% of cases in 2022 were settled through formal legal channels, while the rest were resolved through informal mediation or were not followed up due to specific constraints. This data must be read carefully. Informal settlement is not always negative, especially when children are involved and the aim is to restore social relations. However, without clear criteria, informal settlement can create impunity, reduce preventive effects, and allow conflict to recur because perpetrators do not understand legal consequences.

On the personnel aspect, the research shows different competency needs between the Patrol Sub-Directorate and the Crowd-Control Sub-Directorate. Crowd-control personnel are usually closer to crowd-management training, while patrol personnel are often the first to arrive at brawl locations. As a result, personnel who make the earliest decisions are not necessarily those who have received the most intensive crowd-control training. This finding indicates the need to redistribute training, not merely to increase training. All personnel who may become first responders must understand standards for first action, victim protection, use of force, and post-operation documentation.

On the societal aspect, the research identifies low early reporting as an important barrier. Many potential brawls are actually known to residents, students, traders, drivers, or local figures before conflict breaks out. However, that information does not always reach the Samapta Directorate because people fear retaliation, distrust that reports will be followed up, or lack safe reporting channels. This shows that a quick-response system cannot rely only on call-center technology; it also needs social networks that make residents willing to provide information before violence occurs.

On the cultural aspect, the research shows that brawls often receive informal legitimacy through narratives of group solidarity. Terms such as dignity, revenge, courage, and loyalty become the language that makes violence appear normal in the eyes of participants. This result explains why legal socialization that merely mentions criminal threats is not always effective. For groups that glorify violence, legal threats may be weaker than peer-group pressure. Therefore, the data support the need for interventions that transform narratives, not only increase threats.

5. Comparison

The main finding of this article is that the Samapta Directorate does not suffer from a deficit of authority, but from a deficit in the optimization of authority. The attributive framework through the Police Law, the organizational framework through Police Regulations on the organizational structure of regional police units, and the operational framework through rules on crowd control and the use of force have formed a relatively complete basis for action. Therefore, recommendations that merely demand the creation of new regulations are insufficient. New regulations may indeed help, especially in accommodating digital dimensions and the collective character of street crime, but the more urgent problem is how existing authority is translated into procedures, indicators, training, and consistent accountability.

From the perspective of authority theory, the actions of the Samapta Directorate are lawful insofar as they are based on legal grounds, remain within the scope of authority, and follow established procedures. However, formal validity does not automatically generate social legitimacy. Social legitimacy depends on whether the public views police action as necessary, proportional, and accountable. Procedural-justice literature shows that citizens' experiences in interactions with police shape levels of trust, compliance, and willingness to cooperate (Li et al., 2024). In the context of brawls, public trust determines whether early information about potential conflict is conveyed to officers or withheld by communities out of fear and distrust.

The dominance of the repressive function is both a conceptual and practical problem. Conceptually, the duties of the National Police are not limited to enforcement, but also include maintaining public security and order and providing protection. Practically, successfully dispersing a brawl does not always prevent the next brawl. If success indicators count only the incidents dispersed, the organization will be encouraged to produce visible but shallow achievements. By contrast, preventive success is often invisible precisely because it consists of events that do not occur. This is why the Samapta Directorate needs to develop

new performance indicators that assess prevention, coordination, and public trust rather than enforcement alone.

Quick-response patrols need to be repositioned. So far, quick response is often understood as the speed of arriving at the location. This article argues that speed is only one dimension. A good quick response must include the speed of information, the accuracy of risk analysis, the capacity of personnel to perform lawful first action, and the quality of information transfer to follow-up units. If a patrol unit arrives quickly but lacks contextual information, does not understand the limits on the use of force, or fails to record the chronology properly, a quick response can become a rough and unaccountable response. Therefore, quick response must be built as a data and procedural system, not merely as a fleet.

The digital dimension is a challenge that must enter SOPs. Contemporary brawls do not always begin on the street; they often begin with provocative speech, uploaded videos, challenges between groups, or the spread of revenge narratives. If the Samapta Directorate only moves after a physical report is received, it will always be downstream. The use of social media for early detection must be carried out carefully so as not to violate privacy and freedom of expression, but the need to build an early-warning mechanism cannot be ignored. Amendments to police regulations that emphasize the handling of cybercrime and professionalism must be translated into accountable digital governance.

The factor of facilities and infrastructure shows that legal effectiveness has a material dimension. A legal command to respond to brawls will not be effective without vehicles, communication devices, crowd-control equipment, and adequate mapping technology. However, this article rejects the conclusion that the main solution is always additional budget. Managerial improvements can have a rapid impact: auditing patrol routes, mapping high-risk points based on historical data, integrating reporting channels, maintaining patrol fleets, and cooperating in the use of local-government CCTV. Thus, facilities are not only about quantity, but also about governance.

The societal factor is the key to sustainability. A society that does not trust the police will be slow to report; a society that regards brawls as a mechanism of honor will find legal advice difficult to accept; families and schools that are not involved will cause police intervention to stop on the street. Therefore, Bhabinkamtibmas and networks of local figures need to be positioned as important nodes in the Samapta ecosystem. This approach aligns with studies of student-brawl control that emphasize the importance of a multi-stakeholder model (Susetyo, 2018). The police cannot replace the functions of families, schools, and communities, but they can become catalysts of coordination when they possess public trust.

The cultural factor shows the limits of a criminal-law approach. A violent subculture cannot be erased through short-term raids because it concerns identity, prestige, seniority relations, conflict memory, and group symbols. Cultural control requires a longer horizon through peace education, digital literacy, alternative youth-expression spaces, and revitalization of local values such as *silih asah*, *silih asih*, and *silih asuh*. In the West Java context, a cultural approach is not romanticization of tradition, but an effort to find a local language capable of countering the glorification of violence. Here, the role of the Samapta Directorate should not be as a sole actor, but as a facilitator of security working with local government, schools, religious leaders, and youth communities.

From a policy perspective, this article offers an ecosystem model of legal effectiveness. The model views Soekanto's five factors not as separate lists of barriers, but as a chain of mutually influencing elements. Good regulation requires personnel who understand it; personnel require facilities; facilities require community information; communities require trust; and trust is influenced by culture and experiences of interaction with police. If one link is broken, overall effectiveness decreases. Therefore, a brawl-control strategy must set priorities according to time horizons: personnel and facility reform in the short term; trust-building and coordination in the medium term; and transformation of violent culture in the long term.

The novelty of this article lies in shifting the way Samapta's role is read. Samapta is positioned not only as a unit that disperses crowds, but as a node of street-security governance. In this role, Samapta must perform three functions simultaneously: maintaining legality of action, maintaining speed and accuracy of response, and maintaining social legitimacy. These three functions are not always easy to balance, but that balance determines whether brawl control will merely extinguish symptoms or genuinely reduce cycles of violence.

Updating the legal basis has methodological implications. A thesis that still refers to Chief of Police Regulation Number 22 of 2010 needs adjustment so that reviewers do not regard it as insufficiently current. Police Regulation Number 14 of 2018 and its 2024 and 2025

amendments show that the regional police organization continues to be structured in response to new needs, including cybercrime dynamics and changing forms of threat. This article therefore treats the older reference as historical context, not as the primary basis. This update is important to meet the standards of a legal journal article that demands accuracy of legal status and regulatory relevance.

Discussion of informal settlement must be placed within a balanced framework. On one hand, brawls involving children or local communities are not always effectively resolved through full criminalization, especially when the long-term objective is restoration and conflict prevention. On the other hand, a restorative approach must not turn into compromise without accountability. The Samapta Directorate, together with related units, needs criteria for when mediation may be pursued, when criminal proceedings must proceed, and how mediation outcomes are monitored. Without monitoring, mediation merely moves the problem from the legal sphere to the social sphere.

Preventive performance indicators can be designed more concretely. Examples include the number of risk maps updated each month, the number of high-risk schools with joint prevention plans, the number of verified early reports, the average time for distributing information from the call center to the nearest unit, the percentage of operations with procedural-compliance checklists, the number of post-operation evaluations that produce recommendations, and trends in declining repeated brawls in the same locations. Indicators of this kind help change organizational culture from merely reactive to learning-based.

The need for cross-sectoral coordination also requires changes in forum design. Regional leadership forums, schools, education offices, social services, public-order officers, and youth communities should not meet only after major incidents. Prevention forums need regular, data-based agendas: mapping high-risk areas, analyzing conflict triggers, identifying at-risk groups, dividing roles, and conducting periodic evaluation. The Samapta Directorate can serve as a provider of security information and a facilitator of response, but social interventions such as family assistance, youth activities, and peace education must be carried out by actors that possess social and educational mandates.

Attention to human rights should not be understood as an obstacle to effectiveness. On the contrary, human-rights principles are a condition for long-term effectiveness. Disproportionate use of force may succeed in dispersing a brawl at the moment, but it can create trauma, anger, and declining trust that makes communities reluctant to cooperate. Thus, compliance with the principles of proportionality, necessity, legality, and accountability is not an administrative burden, but a security strategy. This is in line with the direction of the latest Police Law amendment, which emphasizes professionalism, transparency, accountability, and human-rights education.

Ultimately, brawl control must be understood as part of governance, not merely enforcement. Enforcement emphasizes who is arrested and how crowds are dispersed. Governance asks how risks are mapped, how information flows, how actors share roles, how victims are protected, how perpetrators are guided or processed, how communities trust, and how violent culture is transformed. Within a governance framework, the Samapta Directorate remains important, but success is no longer imposed upon it alone. Street security becomes a collective responsibility facilitated by lawful and accountable police authority.

6. Conclusion

This article concludes that the role of the Samapta Directorate of the West Java Regional Police in brawl control has a strong and relatively comprehensive legal basis. That authority derives from the core duties of the National Police, updated regional police organizational regulations, and technical rules on crowd control and the use of force. However, implementation of that authority is not yet fully optimal because performance orientation still tends to highlight repressive functions more than pre-emptive, preventive, and coordinative functions. Thus, the main problem is not a lack of authority, but how existing authority is translated into better procedures, indicators, training, facilities, and accountability.

The barriers faced by the Samapta Directorate are multidimensional. In the legal factor, regulations need to be harmonized and updated to respond to the digital dimension of brawls. In the law-enforcement factor, priority lies in equalizing training, strengthening personnel integrity, and ensuring leadership continuity. In the facilities factor, quick response requires integrated vehicles, communication systems, and mapping technology. In the societal factor, low trust and participation must be addressed through Bhabinkamtibmas, safe reporting channels, and community dialogue. In the cultural factor, violent subcultures must be intervened in through peace education, digital literacy, and revitalization of local values.

The theoretical implication of this article is the need to integrate authority theory with legal-effectiveness theory in policing studies. Formal legality answers only whether the police may act; legal effectiveness answers whether that action works, is accepted, and is sustainable. The practical implication is the need to change the performance indicators of the Samapta Directorate from dispersal outputs toward indicators of prevention, accountability, and public trust. The policy implication is the need for quick-response SOPs specific to different types of brawls, integrated communication systems, and proactive cross-sectoral coordination.

Further research is recommended to quantitatively test the relationship between fleet ratio and response time, training intensity and procedural compliance, and the quality of Bhabinkamtibmas and community early reporting. Comparative research across regional police units is also needed to distinguish general patterns from patterns specific to West Java. In this way, the study of brawl control can move from case description toward the development of a more measurable and accountable public-security policy model.

A practical recommendation that can be immediately undertaken is the preparation of an integrated SOP for brawl control that combines quick-response patrols, crowd control, child protection, documentation of the use of force, and coordination with investigative units. The SOP should include a brief post-operation form so that evaluation does not rely only on memory or narrative reports. In addition, the West Java Regional Police can develop a brawl-risk dashboard that integrates incident data, community reports, patrols, high-risk schools, and digital activities that have been verified accountably. This instrument would help transform prevention from routine activity into data-based decision-making.

The academic recommendation of this article is the need to develop more interdisciplinary police-law studies. Brawls are objects of law, but also objects of criminology, sociology, social psychology, public policy, and digital studies. Legal articles seeking to enter accredited journals must demonstrate the capacity to dialogue with other disciplines without losing juridical focus. Therefore, future research should not only ask whether police action is lawful, but also whether it is effective, fair, trusted, and sustainable.

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